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Appellant Barbara R. Krambule, by and through counsel Jay D. Edmonds and 
Paige Williamson, and pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 49 submits the 
following petition for writ of certiorari in this matter. 
QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW 
L Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Appellant's claim for 
child support for her minor son is barred by res judicata, 
II, Whether the Court of Appeals abused its discretion in holding the trial court 
erred in finding there was a substantial change in circumstances and therefore 
had no basis on which to modify the divorce decree. 
IIL Whether the Court of Appeals erred in failing to consider the best interests of 
the child for whom support is sought 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
The court of Appeals opinion in this case is found at Krambule v. Krambule, No. 
981567-CA(UtahApp. 1999). 
STATEMENT OF SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum Decision July 9, 1998 dismissing 
Respondent's appeal of partial summary judgment. (R.410) The Court of Appeals 
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decision in this matter was entered on December 9, 1999. The Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3). 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
(1) Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5: 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, 
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations 
for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(2) Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-6 
Time of trial. If the issue of paternity is raised in action commenced during 
the pregnancy of the mother, the trial shall not, without the consent of the 
alleged father, be held until after the birth or miscarriage but during such 
delay testimony may be perpetuated according to the laws of this state. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties were married on the 31st day of March, 1979. The Petitioner gave birth 
to two children, Stephanie Krambule, born on January 20, 1985 and Matthew Krambule, 
born on March 24, 1992. The parties entered into a stipulation and property settlement 
agreement on the 16th day of January, 1992. (R. 27) See Appendix 3 The Respondent 
appeared in court on the 10th day of February, 1992 and presented testimony concerning 
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jurisdiction and grounds and introduced the stipulation and agreement. (R. 39) The 
divorce decree was signed by the judge on the 3rd day of April, 1992 and entered with the 
clerk of the court on the 6th day of April, 1992. (R. 43) The Petitioner filed a verified 
petition on July 15, 1996 in which the Petitioner requested the court to make a 
determination as to the Respondent's responsibility for the minor child Matthew 
Krambule. (R. 50) 
The trial court invited the parties to submit motions for summary judgment on the 
paternity issue. (R. 218) The motions were heard on the 21st day of January, 1998 and 
the judge issued a bench ruling. (R. 264) The findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
an order on motion for summary judgment were signed by the judge on March 24, 1998 
and filed with the clerk of the court on March 27, 1998. (R. 326, 331) See Appendix 2. 
An evidentiary hearing concerning the financial aspects of the court's ruling was held on 
the 30th day of April, 1998. (R. 379) This hearing resulted in findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and a modified divorce decree, which were entered with the clerk of 
the court on the 9th day of July, 1998. (R. 395, 405) See Appendix 2. The Respondent 
filed an appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals on or about the 8th day of September, 1998. 
The Court of Appeals rendered it's opinion reversing the trial court on December 9, 1999. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties were married on March 31, 1979. The parties had two children, 
Stephanie, born January 29, 1985, and Matthew, born March 24, 1992. Both children 
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were conceived through artificial insemination. The facts surrounding the second child 
are at issue in this case. The parties have separated twice since their marriage, once in 
late 1989 and again on or about May 2, 1991. (Deposition of Barbara R. Krambule, 
hereinafter Krambule depo., pp 9-11) (R. 485). On or about July 18, 1990, the parties 
agreed to again use artificial insemination to conceive a child. On that date the parties 
signed an agreement entitled "Consent to Perform Procedures to Achieve Pregnancy 
through Artificial Insemination of Donor Sperm". See Appendix 3. Beginning in 
August, 1990, and continuing thereafter until January 1991, Petitioner underwent various 
medical procedures to prepare for the artificial insemination process which included two 
surgical procedures and the administration of medication to prevent her from 
menstruating. In approximately February, 1991, Petitioner and Respondent picked three 
potential sperm donors attempting to choose a donor with the same features as the 
Respondent. (Krambule depo., pp. 14-16). Beginning in February, 1991, and continuing 
thereafter until Petitioner conceived, she began undergoing blood tests, taking fertility 
drugs, having ultrasounds and undergoing the insemination process. (Krambule depo., 
pp. 17-18). 
The parties separated on approximately May 3, 1991 and Petitioner conceived on 
or about June 23, 1991, approximately one month after the parties separated. (Krambule 
depo., pp. 18). During the month after separation the Petitioner continued with the 
process because she believed that they would work things out as they had before in the 
previous separation. (Krambule depo., p 21). In fact, during the Summer of 1991, the 
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parties continued seeing each other socially. (Krambule depo., p47). After separating, 
Respondent wrote a letter to the Petitioner which she received at the end of May, 1991 in 
an attempt to reconcile with the Petitioner. (Krambule depo.,pp40-41). See Appendix 3 
A copy of this letter and its typewritten equivalent was included as Deposition Exhibit 3 
to the Petitioner's deposition. The letter, after discussing the financial ramifications of 
divorce, states "And if you get pregnant I've got no idea how that's going to work." This 
letter admits that the Respondent knew Barbara Krambule was continuing the artificial 
insemination procedure and could still get pregnant. (Krambule depo., p43). 
Three months after conception, in approximately September, 1991, Respondent 
initiated divorce proceedings. (R. 1) In approximately November or December 1991, the 
Respondent's counsel prepared a stipulation and property settlement agreement. (R. 1) 
On December 3, 1991, Petitioner's attorney sent a letter to Respondent's attorney stating 
that the Petitioner wished to pursue child support for the child with which she was 
pregnant. (R. 84) See appendix 3. 
Prior to the preparation and execution of the stipulation and agreement, the 
Petitioner was admitted to St. Benedict's Hospital for emotional and mental problems 
resulting from verbal abuse, threats made by the Respondent and the impending divorce. 
(Krambule depo. p 25) It was during this hospitalization that she was driven by her 
father to her attorney's office to sign the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement 
whereby she was then returned to St. Benedict's Hospital to continue treatment. 
(Krambule depo. p26). 
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Matthew was born on March 24, 1992, and the Divorce Decree was entered on 
April 6, 1992. (R. 43) Petitioner did not pursue paternity after Matthew was born 
because the Respondent always promised to do what was right for Matthew in the future. 
(Krambule depo p28) The Respondent continually led the Petitioner to believe that he 
would assume responsibility for Matthew by telling the other minor child that he would 
start visiting with her and her brother when Matthew was older. Then Respondent 
wanted to wait until a child psychologist determined what was best for Matthew. When 
Petitioner realized that the Respondent was never going to accept responsibility for 
Matthew she initiated this proceeding. 
At the request of the trial court, both parties submitted motions for summary 
judgment. (R. 218) The Petitioner's motion was supported b the Petitioner's deposition, 
which was published. The Respondent's motion was not supported by deposition or by 
Affidavit. On January 21, 1998 a hearing on the summary judgments was held before 
Judge Darwin Hansen. That hearing resulted in findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
an order on motion for summary judgment, which documents were filed with the clerk on 
March 27, 1998. (R. 326, 331) See Appendix 2. After the Court's ruling on the motion 
for summary judgment, an evidentiary hearing relating to the financial obligations of the 
Respondent as the result of the summary judgment ruling was held before Judge Hansen 
on the 30th day of April, 1998. (R. 379). Findings of fact, conclusions of law and a 
modified decree of divorce were entered with the clerk of the court on July 9, 1998. (R. 
395) See Appendix 2. 
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The Respondent appealed from the trial court's order on the motions for summary 
judgment and from the evidentiary hearing held on April 30, 1998. After briefing and 
argument, the Court of Appeals issued an opinion on December 9, 1999, holding (1) 
Petitioner's claim for an increase in child support for Stephanie, an order theat 
Respondent pay child support for Matthew and an order declaring Respondent as 
Matthew's child was res judicata and (2) the trial court erred in finding there was a 
substantial change in circumstances and therefore had no basis to modify the decree of 
divorce. Krambule v. Krambule, No. 981567-CA (Utah App. 1999); Appendix 1. 
Petitioner now seeks review of the Court of Appeals opinion. 
REASONS FOR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR CHILD SUPPORT FOR HER MINOR 
SON IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA. 
The Court of Appeals incorrectly held that res judicata barred Petitioner's claim 
for the support of Matthew. "Res judicata has two branches claim preclusion and issue 
preclusion." Masters v. Worslev. 777 P.2d 499, 503 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Issue 
preclusion applies when the issues have been litigated in a prior cause of action and it 
requires that the issue in the prior case be fully litigated. IdL Claim preclusion prevents 
relitigation of claims that have been fully litigated by the parties on the merits or claims 
which could have or should have been litigated in the prior action, but were not raised. 
In the present case the Court of Appeals held that claim preclusion barred the Petitioner's 
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claim for Matthew's support. 
The Petitioner could not have litigated the issue of child support for Matthew in 
the divorce proceeding. In order for the issue of support to be litigated in the divorce 
proceeding, there would have had to have been an initial finding of paternity. Absent the 
consent of the Respondent paternity could not have been litigated dining the divorce 
proceedings as the child had yet to be bom. This is clearly stated in § 78-45a-6, Utah 
Code Annotated "If the issue of paternity is raised in action commenced during the 
pregnancy of the mother, the trial shall not, without the consent of the alleged father, be 
held until after the birth or miscarriage . . .". The claim for support of Matthew was not 
litigated during the divorce proceedings nor could it have been because the issue of 
paternity could not be decided until Matthew was bom. 
The Court of Appeals applied the doctrine of res judicata indicating that because 
the birth of Matthew was foreseeable the issue of his support should have been litigated. 
However, foreseeablity does not allow paternity litigation to proceed absent the 
Respondent's consent. 
The issue of paternity and, therefore, support for Matthew could not have been 
raised during the divorce proceeding. If an issue could not have been raised, then res 
judicata does not apply. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
HOLDING THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THERE WAS 
A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES 
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The Court of Appeals held that since the issue of support for Matthew was res 
judicata the trial court erred in finding that there had been a substantial change in 
circumstances to warrant modifying the decree of divorce. The court in Stevens v. 
Collard. 837 P.2d 593 (Utah 1992), stated the standard of review in determining the 
sufficiency of the trial courts finding of changed circumstances, " a trial courts decision 
concerning modification of a divorce decree will not be disturbed absent an abuse of 
discretion." (Quoting Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d at 838.) The Court of Appeals did 
not apply this standard. Instead, the Court of Appeals reviewed the trial courts factual 
finding of a substantial change in circumstances under a summary judgement review 
standard. The standard of review for summary judgement as correctly stated by the Court 
of Appeals in the present case is to review the trial court's ruling for correctness. The 
Court of Appeals incorrectly applied this standard to the entire case presented when only 
part of the case before them came to them on appeal from summary judgement. The trial 
court invited each party to submit a motion for summary judgement on the paternity 
issue. The issue of paternity, and only the issue of paternity, was decided by summary 
judgment. Following the trial courts ruling on the motion for summary judgement on 
March 24, 1998 the trial court held an evidentiary hearing. While the issue of paternity 
was decided as question of law under summary judgement the issue of whether there is a 
change in circumstance is a factual determination. 
The court in Department of Human Services v. Irizarrv. 943 P.2d 676 (Utah 1997) 
stated "before enumerating the facts, we address the standard of review. An appellate 
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court "will not reverse the findings of fact of a trial court sitting without a jury unless 
they are 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" 
(quoting MacKav v. Hardv. 896 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1995)) 
The trial court determined that there was a substantial change in circumstances 
since the entry of the decree of divorce, namely the birth of the parties second child. An 
additional child for whom support is sought certainly is a change in circumstances which 
affects the ability to provide for both children. Such a finding is not against the weight of 
the evidence and should not have been reversed. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE 
THE CHILD'S RIGHT TO SUPPORT, 
The Court of Appeals did not consider the strong public policy concern for 
paternity and the support of minor children. In reversing the trial court's decision the 
Court of Appeals has left a child without the support of one of his parents. In doing so 
the court has, in essence ignored the well precedented rule that child support is the right 
of the child. See Gullev v. Gullev, 570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1977), Department of Human 
Services v. Irizarrv. 945 P.2d 676 (Utah 1977) Huck v. HucL 734 P.2d 417 (Utah 1986) 
Baggs v. Anderson. 528 P.2d 141 (Utah 1974). In Irizarrv the court noted that "the right 
of the minor children to support cannot be bartered away, extinguished, estopped or in 
any way defeated by the agreement or conduct of the parties". The Court of Appeals 
decision that the issue of child support for Matthew is res judicata ignores this principal. 
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A child not born at the time of the litigation certainly had no opportunity to litigate the 
issue of his own support. Furthermore, action or inaction by the Plaintiff and 
Respondent cannot defeat his right to support by both of his parents. Therefore, the issue 
cannot be res judicata, as Matthew's rights have not been extinguished. 
In addition, Matthew's mother, the Petitioner, is an appropriate person the enforce 
the rights of her son. Although the right to child support belongs to the child the court in 
Szarak v. Sandoval pointed out, "the father's liability for the education and support of the 
child can be enforced by parties other than the child, but in such cases the child is still the 
real party in interest.) 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1981). 
CONCLUSION 
The issues of paternity and the support were not litigated nor could they have been 
and are therefore not res judicata. The Court of Appeals incorrectly applied the 
principles of res judicata in this case. The Court of Appeals erred in applying the 
standard of review for questions of law to issues of fact determined by the trial court. 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals failed to consider that the right to support is the 
child's right and that the actions of either party cannot defeat that right. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner, Barbara R. Krambule, respectfully petitions this Court 
to grant a writ of certiorari in this matter. 
DATED this 14th day of February, 2000. 
11 
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COURT OF APPEALS RULINGS 
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Ji'i K L.^ 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
R^cky TD. Kfambule, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Barbara R. Krambule, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
COUR 
MEMORANDUM DECISIC 
(Not For Official Publju 
Case No. 980229-CB 
F I L E D 
( J u l y 9, 1998) Qtn5oo3 
Second District, Farmington Department 
The Honorable Darwin C. Hanson 
Attorneys: Robert L. Neeley, Ogden, for Appellant 
Robert A. Echard, Ogden, for Appellee 
Before Judges Davis, Bench, and Greenwood. 
PER CURIAM: 
This matter is before the court on its own motion for 
summary disposition. We dismiss the appeal. 
Appellant seeks to appeal the trial court's March 27, 19S 
order granting partial summary judgment to appellee and 
concluding that appellant is the legal father of the minor chi 
in question. However, an order granting only partial summary 
judgment is not appealable. See Holt v. Biggs, 714 P.2d 643, 
(Utah 1986) ; gee fllgQ, Spytfr Shores? CpnqeggJQn Inc. v. State 
Division of Parks, 600 P.2d 550, 553 (Utah 1979) (concluding tl 
a partial summary judgment is not generally a final judgment ai 
hence is not appealable). Since the subject order concerns a 
partial summary judgment and the trial court specifically 
reserved issues of child support, medical expenses, and other 
financial determinations for future resolution following an 
evidentiary hearing, we conclude that it is not final. 
Absent a Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) certification, a Utah R. Ap] 
P. 5 petition for permission to file an interlocutory appeal, o: 
a Utah R. Civ. P. 65B petition for extraordinary relief, none oi 
which have been filed in this case, we may only consider appeals 
from final judgments. See Utah R. App. P. 3(a); Tyler v. 
Krambule v. Krambule, No. 981567-CA (Utah App. 12/09/1999) 
[ 1 ] IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
[2] Case No. 981567-CA 
[3] 1999.UT.0042241 <http ://www. versuslaw. com> 
[4] December 9, 1999 
[5] RICKY D. KRAMBULE, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, 
v. 
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE. 
[6] Attorneys: Robert L. Neeley, Ogden, for Appellant Robert A. Echard and Steven L. 
Fenton, Ogden, for Appellee 
[7] Before Judges Greenwood, Davis, and Orme. 
[8] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Davis, Judge: 
[9] OPINION 
[ 10] (For Official Publication) 
[11] FILED 
[12] Second District, Farmington Department The Honorable Darwin C. Hansen 
[13] ]fl Ricky D. Krambule (Rick) appeals the trial court's order granting partial summary 
judgment in favor of Barbara R. Krambule, in which the court concluded that Rick was 
the legal father of Matthew Krambule, and the subsequent modification of the divorce 
decree ordering Rick to pay child support for Matthew. Because Barbara's claim is barred 
by res judicata, the trial court erred in finding there was a substantial change in 
circumstances and therefore had no basis on which to modify the divorce decree. 
Accordingly, we reverse. 
[14] BACKGROUND 
[15] |2 Rick and Barbara were married in 1979. Although they desired to become parents, 
they discovered that Rick was sterile. Upon considering various options, the couple 
decided to go to the University of Utah School of Medicine so Barbara could be 
artificially inseminated with the sperm of an anonymous donor. They tried unsuccessfully 
for a number of years to conceive a child, but ultimately, as a result of this procedure, 
Barbara conceived a daughter, Stephanie, who was born in 1985. 
[16] ]f3 In 1989, after experiencing some marital discord, Rick and Barbara separated. 
Eventually, however, the couple reconciled and, in approximately July 1990, decided to 
attempt to have another child. To that end, the couple again went to the University of 
Utah for artificial insemination. To consent to the procedure, Rick and Barbara entered 
into an agreement with the University of Utah, which provided in part: 
[17] 2. We hereby affirm our desire to achieve pregnancy and request that artificial 
insemination procedures be utilized in an attempt to achieve pregnancy in the wife with 
semen obtained from an unidentified and undisclosed third party donor(s). 
[18] 8. We acknowledge that our participation in the artificial insemination procedure(s) is 
voluntary. 
[19] 10. We jointly and severally agree to recognize and accept the full legal, moral, parental, 
financial, social, emotional and cultural responsibility and care of any offspring that may 
result from any pregnancy achieved through the artificial insemination procedure(s). We 
also mutually and individually agree to accept and assume the same duties, obligations 
and responsibilities toward such offspring to the full extent in the same manner as owed 
by the undersigned to naturally occurring offspring, and acknowledge and agree that any 
offspring resulting from the artificial insemination procedure(s) shall be their legal heirs(s) 
and that the said offspring shall be, for all purposes, the child of the husband and wife, 
and the husband shall for all purposes be considered the father of the said offspring. 
[20] After entering into the agreement, the couple selected three anonymous donors and began 
the artificial insemination process, which included Barbara's submission to ongoing 
treatment, medication, and multiple surgeries. 
[21] Tf4 Despite their rejuvenated marriage and plans for the future, more discord arose 
between Rick and Barbara and, on or about May 3, 1991, Rick moved out of the home. 
Notwithstanding this separation, Barbara continued the artificial insemination process 
and, on June 23, 1991, conceived a son, Matthew. *fhl Although Barbara did not inform 
Rick that she was continuing the insemination process, in a post-separation letter written 
by Rick to Barbara, Rick stated, "if you get pregnant[,] I've got no idea how that's going 
to work." 
[22] [^5 A few months after separation, in August 1991, Rick initiated divorce proceedings. 
Subsequently, Barbara's counsel wrote a letter to Rick's counsel, advising that Barbara 
was pregnant and would not agree to a stipulation and property settlement that did not 
provide for support of the expected child. *fh2 Nonetheless, the couple apparently 
eventually agreed on an alternative settlement and, on January 16, 1992, they executed a 
stipulation which did not require Rick to support the expected child, but did require him 
to pay alimony. See supra note 2. After a February 1992 hearing, the commissioner 
concluded there were irreconcilable differences and accepted the stipulated settlement. 
The minute entry from this hearing further indicated, "There is a child expected by 
[Barbara] but the child is not [Rick's]." 
[23] f 6 Matthew was born on March 24, 1992, and on April 6, 1992, the divorce decree was 
entered which incorporated the stipulated settlement. The decree did not require Rick to 
pay support for Matthew, but did order support to be paid for the couple's first child, 
Stephanie. Rick was also ordered to pay alimony for up to four years or until Barbara 
graduated from college, and to pay all reasonable book and tuition expenses for Barbara's 
college education. 
[24] ]|7 In July 1996, over four years after entry of the divorce decree, Barbara petitioned the 
court to modify the decree. In her petition, Barbara requested an increase in child support 
for Stephanie and an order for Rick to pay child support for Matthew, asserting "[t]here 
has been a material change of circumstances since the Court originally established child 
support in this matter consisting in part of an additional child being born to the parties." 
Barbara further asserted that the court never ruled on the paternity of Matthew and 
requested an order declaring Rick the father. 
[25] f 8 Before trial, both parties moved for summary judgment on the issue of whether Rick 
was the legal father of Matthew. Neither party disputed that Rick was not Matthew's 
biological father, and the court so ruled. *fh3 The court, however, granted Barbara's 
motion, concluding that although not genetically related, Rick had a legal obligation to 
Matthew. The court explained that because the couple entered into a binding contract for 
artificial insemination which neither party repudiated prior to conception, with respect to 
Matthew, both parties had the rights and responsibilities of a natural parent. 
f9 The matter subsequently went to trial on the remaining issues of child support, 
visitation, day care expenses, medical expenses, medical and life insurance, and attorney 
fees, regarding both children. The trial court concluded there had been a substantial 
change in circumstances. *fh4 The court also found that before the original divorce 
decree was entered Barbara made statements to Rick that she wanted only the Krambule 
name for Matthew; that although Barbara was emotional during the divorce process, she 
nonetheless testified that her decision to make no claim for Matthew was carefully 
considered while she had the assistance of counsel; and that in return for Barbara 
abandoning a claim for Matthew's support, Rick agreed to pay alimony and provide for 
her education. Accordingly, although the court concluded Rick was responsible for child 
support, it ruled that Barbara was equitably estopped from recovering child support for 
Matthew accruing before she filed her petition to modify, and thus ordered Rick to pay 
child support only prospectively from the date of filing. Rick now appeals from the entire 
judgment. 
[27] ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[28] 1fl0 On appeal, our review centers on the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment, 
in which it ruled that Rick has a duty to support Matthew. '"Summary judgment is 
appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' Because a summary judgment presents questions 
of law, we review the trial court's ruling for correctness." In re General Determination of 
the Rights to the Use of All the Water, 982 P.2d 65, 69 (Utah 1999) (citations omitted); 
see Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Thus, although we generally review the determination to 
modify a divorce decree for an abuse of discretion, insofar as that determination is based 
on a Conclusion of law, we review it for correctness. See Toone v. Toone, 952 P.2d 112, 
114 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). We do not disturb the trial court's factual findings after trial 
unless clearly erroneous. See Hudema v. Carpenter, 380 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 5 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1999); Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530, 534 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (per 
curiam). 
[29] ANALYSIS 
[30] %l 1 Rick argues that Barbara may not receive child support for Matthew because such 
claim is barred by res judicata, she has waived any contractual rights granted under the 
artificial insemination agreement, and she is equitably estopped from claiming that Rick is 
Matthew's father. Rick further argues that the insemination agreement was ambiguous 
and material issues of fact exist as to the parties' intent. Finally, Rick argues that he 
should not be held to be Matthew's legal father because he did not consent to Barbara's 
continuing the insemination process after the separation. *fh5 
f^ 12 We begin our review by evaluating whether res judicata precludes Barbara from 
asserting that Rick owed a duty of support for Matthew. "Res judicata has two branches: 
claim preclusion and issue preclusion." Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499, 503 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). At issue here is the claim preclusion branch of res judicata. "Claim preclusion 
prevents relitigation of claims that have been fully litigated between the same parties, and 
also precludes claims which 'could and should have been litigated in the prior action, but 
were not raised.'" Id. (quoting Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987)) (emphasis added); see also Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 303, 
305 (Utah 1985) ("'When there has been an adjudication, it becomes res judicata as to 
those issues which were either tried and determined, or upon all issues which the party 
had a fair opportunity to present and have determined in the other proceeding.'") (citation 
omitted). 
f 13 The principles of res judicata apply fully in the context of divorce proceedings. See 
Jacobsen, 703 P.2d at 305. Nonetheless, "[t]he court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the children and their support... as 
is reasonable and necessary." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (Supp. 1999); see also Bayles 
v. Bayles, 981 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Consequently, principles of res 
judicata require that "a party seeking modification of a divorce decree must demonstrate 
that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred since the entry of the decree, and 
not contemplated in the decree itself." Bayles, 981 P.2d at 406 (alteration, citations, and 
quotation marks omitted); accord Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). "In the absence of such a showing, the decree shall not be modified . . . ." 
Jacobsen, 703 P.2d at 305. 
f 14 Although Barbara's petition for modification asked the court to revisit the amount of 
child support due with respect to both Stephanie and Matthew, and Matthew was not 
mentioned in the original decree, the sole apparent factual basis for a determination of 
changed circumstances with respect to Matthew was that Matthew was an additional 
child born to the parties but not provided for in the decree. 
If 15 Barbara must show that the alleged "'"substantial change in circumstances has 
occurred since the entry of the decree."'" Bayles, 981 P.2d at 406 (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). The undisputed facts here show that, other than foreseeable events 
occasioned by the passage of time, nothing new has occurred since entry of the divorce 
decree. That is, before the decree was entered in April 1992, the 1990 insemination 
agreement had been executed and Barbara became pregnant, carried the child to term, 
and gave birth. Further, Barbara had full knowledge that she was pregnant as a result of 
the insemination procedure at the time she executed the stipulated settlement which 
deliberately omitted any obligation for Rick to pay child support for Matthew. Indeed, the 
letter from Barbara's counsel shows she knew she had a claim for Matthew's support at 
least three months before the entry of the decree. See Masters, 777 P.2d at 503 (rejecting 
application of res judicata to a claim not litigated in earlier divorce proceeding, stating the 
claim "could not have been tried in the [original] divorce [proceeding] because [plaintiff] 
had no knowledge of the alleged facts supporting his claim"). Finally, after trial on her 
petition for modification, the trial court found that although Barbara was emotional 
during the divorce process, she testified that her decision not to make a claim for child 
support was carefully considered and made with the assistance of counsel, and that in 
return for Barbara's abandoning this claim Rick agreed to pay alimony and provide for her 
education. 
[35] f 16 In short, there is simply no indication of any circumstances occurring after entry of 
the decree supporting a determination that there had been a substantial change of 
circumstances. As such, Barbara's claim for child support for Matthew based on the 
insemination agreement could and should have been asserted in the original divorce action 
and is therefore now barred under the principles of res judicata. Consequently, we have 
no option but to conclude that the trial court erred in determining there was a substantial 
change in circumstances and thus in modifying the divorce decree to impose a child 
support obligation on Rick with respect to Matthew. *ffa6 
[36] CONCLUSION 
[37] If 17 We conclude that because all facts relating to Barbara's claim for Matthew's support 
were in existence and known to the parties prior to entry of the divorce decree, there has 
been no substantial changed circumstances warranting modification. Hence, Barbara is 
barred by principles of res judicata from now asserting her contractual claim for 
Matthew's support which could and should have been litigated in the original proceeding. 
Consequently, we reverse the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment, and remand 
for entry of partial summary judgment in favor of Rick. We further reverse those portions 
of the trial court's final order based on the determination that Rick was Matthew's legal 
father, and remand for entry of a new final order consistent with this opinion. 
[38] %l8 Reversed and remanded. 
[39] James Z. Davis, Judge 
[40] 1J19 WE CONCUR: 
[41] Pamela T. Greenwood, Associate Presiding Judge 
[42] Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
Opinion Footnotes 
*fhl . The record does not reflect that Rick made any effort to contact the University of 
Utah to withdraw his consent to the artificial insemination. 
*fh2 . The letter provided: In connection with the above matter, my client [Barbara] has 
recently brought to my attention an item that she debated at great lengths whether she 
should or should not pursue and has finally decided she's going to pursue it. Your client 
and my client agreed to artificial insemination so that the parties could have another child. 
This artificial insemination was in fact conducted and as a result my client is pregnant and 
expecting a child. [Barbara] is somewhere between 4 and 6 months pregnant and since 
[Rick] agreed to the artificial insemination and she's going to obtain for me his written 
consent, the child is his and I've tried this before where the Court has acknowledged these 
types of agreements. My client has indicated that if he will not put up a fuss over this 
child, pay the child support in accordance with the schedule for the children, then she 
would give up any claim she has to alimony. In addition, she indicated that she would 
allow overnight visits on Mondays and Wednesdays and when school is not in session, 
which would include holidays and summer vacation. Please review this with your client, 
get back with me and if we can work out a Stipulation along those lines, let me know. 
The Stipulation you sent me does not provide for that and my client is not willing to sign 
it. I did forward to [Barbara] a copy, she has it, and that's what brought this to mind 
because she does not feel that this child should be left out and the parties would then have 
two children, Stephanie and whatever this child turns out to be, whether it's a boy or a 
girl. Please review this with your client and get back with me[,] and if we can resolve it[,] 
great[,] and if not, then let's get it tried. I don't believe we've had a Pre-trial yet[,] and if 
your client is not willing to negotiate this item[,] then one or both of us should file a 
request for Pre-trial. I will await your response. 
*fh3 . Neither party challenges this determination (characterized as a finding of fact) on 
appeal. 
*fh4 . The trial court failed to identify with particularity those facts supporting its 
Conclusion that ,f[t]here has been a substantial change of circumstances since the entry of 
the Decree of Divorce" as required. See Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. 
Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225, 231 (Utah 1995) ("Tailure of the trial 
court to make findings on all material issues is reversible error unless the facts in the 
record are "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the 
judgment.,M") (citations omitted). Regarding Matthew, the only apparent fact supporting 
the Conclusion is the court's earlier ruling that Rick was legally liable under the contract. 
Because Rick does not raise this omission as a basis for reversal, we dispose of this 
appeal on other grounds. 
[47] *fh5 . We note that the trial court correctly analyzed Rick's obligations as arising under 
contract. Whereas the Legislature has addressed issues involving adoption and surrogate 
mothers, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-204 (1999) (prohibiting entry into surrogate 
contracts for profit and providing, inter alia, that "the surrogate mother is the mother of 
the child for all legal purposes"); id. §§ 78-30-1 to -19 (1996 & Supp. 1999) (outlining 
procedures, rights, and obligations in adoption context), when there is an artificial 
insemination using an anonymous donor's sperm, it has not yet addressed the rights and 
obligations of the parties involved, including the biological father, the biological mother 
and her husband, the child, or the health care provider. 
[48] *fh6 . Our Disposition on this basis forecloses the need to address Rick's alternate 
arguments. 
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RICKY D. KRAMBULE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910750473 
Judge: Darwin Hanson 
The above entitled matter came on for a hearing before the Honorable Darwin 
Hanson on the 21st day of January, 1998. Both parties having filed motions for summary judgment, 
the court having reviewed materials submined by counsel and having heard argument from the 
counsel for the parties and being fully informed in the premises, now therefore, the court makes 
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The court does not have the evidentiary information necessary to make a 
determination as to the amount of child support, medical expenses and other financial 
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2. The court is treating this matter as a motion for partial summary judgment 
and will rule solely in the issue of whether or not the Plaintiff is the legal father of the minor child 
in question. 
3. The Plaintiff is not the biological father of the minor child. 
4. In modern society, birth is possible by artificial insemination other means. 
Consequently, the court must look at the facts surrounding the artificial insemination to determine 
the legal obligations of the parties engaged in that type of conception. 
5. The court finds that on July 18, 1990 the parties entered into a contract 
entitled, "Consent to Perform Procedures to Achieve Pregnancy through Artificial Insemination 
of Donor Sperm". The court finds that this contract obligated the Plaintiff and the Defendant to 
assume the legal responsibility for the child that was produced from artificial insemination. This 
legal duty included all of the rights of a minor child of natural parents. 
6. The court finds that this was the second contract the parties had entered into 
of this nature and that a child was produced from the first contract for which both parties have 
assume the full rights as natural parents. 
7. The court finds that in order for this contract to be null and void, an event 
must occur which would terminate the contract. The court does not rule on all the events that could 
terminate such a contract, however, in this case the court rules that a divorce could have terminated 
the contract. The court finds that in this case the child was conceived during the marriage and bom 
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8. The court finds there is a strong public policy to protect the interest of a 
minor child. A separation of the parties is not sufficient to repudiate the contract and the court 
finds that only a divorce obtained prior to the conception of the child would be sufficient to 
repudiate the contract in this case. 
9. The court finds that the Plaintiff is legally the father of the minor child, 
Matthew, who was born on March 24, 1992. 
10. The Plaintiff has all of the obligations and rights associated with being the 
natural parent of Matthew. 
11. The remaining issues that have not been resolved shall be set for a trial. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a legally binding contract for 
artificial insemination. 
2. The contract was not repudiated by the separation of the parties and in this 
case could only be repudiated by a divorce which occurred prior to the conception of the child. 
3. The child in this case, Matthew, was conceived and born prior to the divorce 
of the parties. 
4. The contract is binding between the parties and imposes on both parties the 
legal responsibilities of natural parents to the child. 
5. The court rules that the Plaintiff has the same legal responsibilities and rights 
of a natural parent in regards to Matthew, born on March 24,1992. 
6. The remaining issues that have been unresolved shall be set for an 
evidentiary trial. 
DATED t h i s ^ f day of March, 1998. 
DARWIN HANSON 
District Court Judge 
NOTICE TO COUNSEL 
TO: PLAINTIFF AND HIS COUNSEL: 
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Defendant will submit 
the foregoing Order on Motion for Summary Judgment to Judge Darwin Hanson for his signature 
upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date this notice is mailed to you, allowing three (3) 
days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the 
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DATED this^_ day of March, 1998. 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document(s), postage prepaid, to the following individual(s): 
Robert L. Neeley 
2485 Grant Ave., #200 
Ogden,UT 84401 




ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953 
ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Defendant 
Key Bank Building, Suite 200 
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BARBARA R. KRAMBULE, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910750473 
Judge:"TX,0u hU-i 
The above entitled matter came on for a hearing before the Honorable Darwin 
Hanson on the 21 * day of January, 1998. Both parties having filed motions for summary judgment, 
the court having reviewed materials submitted by counsel and having heard argument from the 
counsel for the parties and being fully informed in the premises, now therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The court grants the Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. 
2. The Plaintiff has all the legal obligations and rights of a natural parent in 
regard to Matthew Krambule, born on March 24,1992. 
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^ DATED this^ZI day of March, 1998. 
f/W>*// 
District Court Judge 
NOTICE TO COUNSEL 
TO: PLAINTIFF AND HIS COUNSEL: 
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Defendant will submit 
the foregoing Order on Motion for Summary Judgment to Judge Darwin Hanson for his signature 
upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date this notice is mailed to you, allowing three (3) 
days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration 1988. Kindly govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED t h i s ^ day of March, 1998. 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Defendant 
,40-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document(s), postage prepaid, to the following individual(s): 
Robert L. Neeley 
2485 Grant Ave., #200 
Ogden, UT 84401 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICKY D. KRAMBULE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 910750473 
Judge: 
The above entitled matter came before the court on the 30th day of April, 1998 on 
Respondent's Petition for Modification. The Petitioner was present in court represented by his 
attorney Robert L. Neeley and the Respondent was present in court represented by her attorney 
Robert A. Echard. The court having received testimony, exhibits, arguments and the contents of 
the legal memorandum, now therefore the court makes the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
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2. Two (2) children were conceived by artificial insemination and born during the 
course of the marriage, namely: STEPHANIE KRAMBULE, born on January 29, 1985 and 
MATTHEW WADE KRAMBULE, born on March 24, 1992. 
3. A Decree of Divorce was signed and entered by the Court on the 3rd day of 
April, 1992. 
4. At the time of the Divorce, the Petitioner monthly income was $3,250.00 and 
the Respondent's monthly income was $2,042.00. 
5. The present annual income of the parties is as follows: 
Petitioner: 
a. Wages - Alpine Paving Mgnmt. 







Therefore, Petitioner's current monthly income is $10,911.00. 
The court does not credit line 7 of the Respondent's Exhibit 7 as income for child 
support because it is the finding of the court that the sum of $44,132.00 is necessary retained 
earnings of the company to operate the business during the coming accounting year of the business. 
Under Section 78-45-7.5(4)(a) UCA, monies for business expenses are not considered income for 
child support purposes. 
Respondent: 
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Therefore, Respondent's current monthly income is $3,538.00. 
6. The Decree of Divorce is silent concerning Matthew, but provides the following 
for Stephanie: 
a. Paragraph 2 gives custody of Stephanie to the Respondent; 
b. Paragraph 3 gives Petitioner standard visitation; 
c. Paragraph 5 awards Respondent $326.00 per month for child support; 
d. Paragraph 7 requires each to pay one-half of the daycare expenses for 
Stephanie. 
7. The Petitioner is current with the payment of child support for Stephanie 
through August, 1997, at which time she began living with Petitioner. The court makes no finding 
or order from that date forward in that Petitioner has a Petition for Change of Custody as to 
Stephanie which is presently pending. 
8. The Petitioner previously disclaimed paternity and therefore denied any legal 
responsibility for Matthew in that Respondent conceived after the parties separated. This court has 
heretofore ruled pursuant to Respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement that given the 
factual predicate of this case, Petitioner is the legal father of Matthew and therefore has the legal 
duties of a biological father. Petitioner, however, alleges that Respondent should be estopped from 
now claiming past legal benefits for Matthew in that she engaged in conduct at the time of the 
divorce which reasonably induced Petitioner to rely thereon to his detriment. 
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a. During late October, 1991, after Respondent' s pregnancy with Matthew 
became known, Respondent told Petitioner that she only wanted the Krambule name for Matthew 
and nothing more from him; 
b. She essentially made the same statement to Petitioner's sister sometime 
later. 
c. After Petitioner filed fro divorce, she initially requested support for the 
expectant child through her then attorney, but later signed a stipulation silent on the matter of the 
child. She further allowed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce to issue 
without any mention of Matthew though he was born at the time. 
d. I hjnun the divorce process, Respondent was very emotional about the 
matter and spent some time in the hospital in December, 1991 as a result. Nevertheless, she 
testified that her decision to make no claim for Matthew was carefully considered and was made 
during the period she had the assistance of counsel. 
e. She filed her petition to modify the Decree of Divorce and for Paternity 
as to Matthew on July 15,1996,4 years and 3 months after the entry of the Decree of Divorce. The 
filing of the Petition was precipitated by Petitioner's failure to accept responsibility for Matthew 
following counseling by the parties as to how the matter concerning the child's fatherless 
circumstance should be handled. 
10. In return for Respondent's failure to act, or to make claim against Petitioner for 
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education at Weber State University in Ogden, Utah, and preceded to live his life without 
consideration as to any financial obligation for Matthew. 
11. Respondent has incurred the following medical debts for herself and Matthew 
from the time of her conception with Matthew until the filing of her Petition to Modify the Decree 
of Divorce: 













12. Respondent has incurred the following child care expenses for Stephanie and 
Matthew since the entry of the Decree of Divorce: 










13. Respondent's reasonable monthly needs for her and both children are as 
Stephanie 
Stephanie 

















Item (family expenses) 
Mortgage on home 
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Each child's need is therefore equal to 1/3 of the family expenses plus lA of the children's expenses 
or $915.00. 
14. Respondent ha s inci u red attorney's fees regarding her I >etition for 1\ lodification 
and for Paternity as follows: 
Nature of Charge Rate Amount 
Attorney fees $l50/hr. $5,803.13 
The total amount does not include fees associated with Petitioner's pending Modification of Decree 
of Divorce concerning a change of custody of Stephanie. Moreover, it appears that the approximate 
number of hours expended is 39 which the court finds reasonable given the nature of the issues 
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15. The court also finds that Respondent is in need of assistance in paying the 
attorney's fees. She has been using her credit card to make ends meet. She has received no 
assistance from Petitioner for her medical care or for Stephanie's child care heretofore itemized 
above. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There has been a substantial change of circumstances since the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce. 
2. Respondent is a fit and proper person to be awarded the care, custody and 
control of Matthew with Petitioner having a reasonable right of visitation based on the statutory 
guidelines. 
3. The parties combined income exceeds the highest amount set forth in the Basic 
Combined Child Support Obligation Table. The Court therefore applies the Common Law in 
determining what a reasonable child support should be. Based on Finding No. 12(?) above, a 
reasonable child support should be the percentage of the parties income to the combined total 
multiplied by $915.00. The combined income is $10,911.00 plus $3,538.00 which equals 
$14,449.00. Petitioner's gross income is 75.5% of that total. Therefore, Petitioner should pay to 
Respondent 75.5% of the demonstrated child support. 75.5% of $915.00 is $691.00 for each child. 
Therefore, Respondent should be awarded child support from the Petitioner for both children in 
the total sum of $1,382.00 per month beginning with the month of August, 1996, which is the 
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4. The Court concludes that the child support should be retroactive to the date 
stated above for the following reasons: 
a. Stephanie: Petitioner has resisted a child support increase for 
Stephanie though his income has significantly increased since the divorce was granted. This is 
demonstrated by most, if not all, of the child support checks ha\ ing the initial's R.Q.F.O. written 
on each. Petitioner testified that the initials stand for "Bitch Queen F Off." The initials started 
appearing soon after Petitioner remarried. The Court concludes that the only reason for placing 
initials of that kind on a child support check is to intimidate and manipulate. Conduct of that kind 
only protracts litigation and does not contribute to a timely resolution. 
b . Iv latthew : Ilie Court concludes that Petitioner is legally responsible 
for paying back child support for Matthew. The paternity statute limits the period to four (4) years 
prior to the determination of paternity. Case law further allows for limiting the time for past child 
support based on the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel if applicable In this matter, the Court finds 
that Respondent's conduct, or lack thereof, during the pregnancy and divorce proceedings, is 
sufficient to disallow payment foi back child support beyond the date she filed for a determination 
of Matthew's paternity based on the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel. 
5. Therefore, the Court finds that Respondent should be awarded judgment against 
Petitioner for back child support as follows: 
a. Stephanie: The amount of the judgment equals $691.00 per month 
for \?> months (boginniny August, 1996 and ending August, 1997 when Stephanie began living 
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The amount is $4,745.00. The period from August, 1997 to date is yet to be determined in 
connection with Petitioner's Petition for Modification. 
b. Matthew: The amount of the judgment is $691.00 per month for 
20 months (beginning August, 1996 and ending April, 1998) which equals $13,820.00. Therefore, 
the total judgment for past due child support is $18,565.00 
6. Each of the parties should be ordered to pay one-half of all future child care for 
the children according to the applicable statutory provisions. 
7. Respondent should be awarded judgment against Petitioner for past due child 
care pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce as follows: 
a. Stephanie: The past due child care is calculated as follows: 
Year Amount 
1992 $361 divided by 2 multiplied $135.00 
by 0.75 (April through Dec.) 
$1627 divided by 4 $407.00 
1993 $835.70 divided by 2 $418.00 
Total $960.00 
b. Matthew: The past due child care is only applicable from August, 
1996 through April, 1998 based on the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel as follows: 
Year Amount 
1996 $969 times 0.42 (5 months 
of the year) divided by 2 





8. The Court concludes that Respondent should keep medical insurance on the 
children in accordance with the applicable statute regarding the sharing of the premiums and costs 
not covered by the policy. The Court makes no award for past medical expenses because they are 
not applicable as to Matthew under the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel and the evidence was 
insufficient to break out those expenses applicable to Respondent ii individually and those applicable 
to the pregnancy and birth of Matthew. 
9. Petitioner should be awarded Stephanie as an exemption on his IRS return and 
Respondent should be awarded Matthew as an exemption on her IRS return A t such time as 
Stephanie is no longer eligible to be taken by Petitioner, then the parties should alternate Matthew 
as an exemption w ith Petitionei ta king him the first year after Stephanie is not long eligible. 
Petitioner's right to take either of the children as an exemption in any year is contingent upon his 
being current with his child support payments to Respondent as of the end of that particular year. 
10. Respondent should be awarded judgment against Petitioner for attorney's fees 
in the sum of $5,803.00 and costs as taxed by the Court pursuant to an appropriate application by 
Kespondeni 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICKY D. KRAMBULE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE, 
Respondent. 
MODIFIED DECREE OF 
DIVORCE 
Civil No. 910750473 
Judge: 
The above entitled matter came before the court on the 30th day of April, 1998 on 
Respondent's Petition for Modification. The Petitioner was present in court represented by his 
attorney Robert L. Neeley and the Respondent was present in court represented by her attorney 
Robert A. Echard. The court having received testimony, exhibits, arguments and the contents of 
the legal memorandum, now therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Respondent is awarded the care, custody and control of Matthew with Petitioner 
having a reasonable right of visitation based on the statutory guidelines. 
2. The parties combined income exceeds the highest amount set forth in the Basic 
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determining what a reasonable child support should be. Child support shall be the percentage of 
the parties income to the combined total multiplied by $915.00. The combined income is 
$10,911.00 plus $3,538.00 which equals $14,449.00. Petitioner's gross income is 75.5% of that 
total. Therefore, Petitioner shall pay to Respondent 75.5% of the demonstrated child support. 
75.5% of $915.00 is $69L00 for each child. Th Respondent is awarded child support from the 
Petitioner for both children in the total sum of $1,382.00 per month beginning with the month of 
August, 1996, which is the month following the month Respondent filed her Petition for 
Modification. 
3. The child support shall be retroactive to the date stated above for the following 
reasons: 
a. Stephanie: Petitioner has resisted a child support increase for 
Stephanie though his income has significantly increased since the divorce was granted. This is 
demonstrated try most, if not all, erf the child support cl leeks ha\ ing the initial's B.Q.I \ 0 written 
on each. Petitioner testified that the initials stand for "Bitch Queen F Off." The initials started 
appearing soon after Petitioner remarried. The Court concludes that the only reason for placing 
initials of that kind on a child support check is to intimidate and manipulate. Conduct of that kind 
only protracts litigation and does not contribute to a timely resolution. 
b. Matthew: Die Court coi lcludes that Petitioner is legally responsible 
for paying back child support for Matthew. The paternity statute limits the period to four (4) years 
prior to the determination of paternity. Case law further allows for limiting the time for past child 
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that Respondent's conduct, or lack thereof, during the pregnancy and divorce proceedings, is 
sufficient to disallow payment for back child support beyond the date she filed for a determination 
of Matthew's paternity based on the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel. 
4. The Respondent is awarded a judgment against Petitioner for back child support 
as follows: 
a. Stephanie: The amount of the judgment equals $691.00 per month 
for 13 months (beginning August, 1996 and ending August, 1997 when Stephanie began living 
with her father) less $326.00 per month for the 13 month period for child support that was paid. 
The amount is $4,745.00. The period from August, 1997 to date is yet to be determined in 
connection with Petitioner's Petition for Modification. 
b. Matthew: The amount of the judgment is $691.00 per month for 
20 months (beginning August, 1996 and ending April, 1998) which equals $13,820.00. Therefore, 
the total judgment for past due child support is $18,565.00 
5. Each of the parties is ordered to pay one-half of all future child care for the 
children according to the applicable statutory provisions. 
6. Respondent is awarded a judgment against Petitioner for past due child care 
pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce as follows: 
a. Stephanie: The past due child care is calculated as follows: 
Year Amount 
1992 $361 divided by 2 multiplied $135.00 
by 0.75 (April through Dec.) 
$1627 divided by 4 $407.00 
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b. Matthew: The past due child care is only applicable from August, 
1996 through April, 1998 based on the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel as follows: 
Year Amount 
1996 $969 times 0.42 (5 months 
of the year) divided by 2 





• • 7. The Respondent shall keep medical insurance on the children in accordance 
with the applicable statute regarding the sharing of the premiums and costs not covered by the 
policy. The Court makes no award for past medical expenses because they are not applicable as 
to Matthew under the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel and the evidence was insufficient to break out 
those expenses applicable to Respondent individually and those applicable to the pregnancy and 
birth ot Matthew. 
8. Petitioner is awarded Stephanie as an exemption on his IRS return and 
Respondent is awarded Matthew as an exemption on hei IRS return At such time as Stephanie is 
no longer eligible to be taken by Petitioner, then the parties shall alternate Matthew as an 
exemption with Petitioner taking him the first year after Stephanie is not long eligible. Petitioner's 
i ight to take either of the children, as an exemption in any year is contingent upon his being current 
with his child support payments to Respondent as of the end of that particular year. 
& % 
9. Respondent is awarded judgment against Petitioner for attorney's fees in the 
sum of $5,803.00 and costs as taxed by the Court pursuant to an appropriate application by 
Respondent. 
DATED this / day oQJfrf, 1998. 
DA^WJK C.HANSEN 












UNIVERSITY OF UTAH SCHOOL OF MEDICINE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 
AND 
DIVISION OF UROLOGY 
CONSENT TO PERFORM PROCEDURES TO ACHIEVE PREGNANCY 
THROUGH ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION OF DONOR SEMEN 
1. We, as husband and wife* acknowledge that we have been 
unable to achieve a pregnancy because of one or more of the 
following conditions, notwithstanding thorough evaluation and 
therapy: 
<A) Abnormality of the semen, including reduced 
numbers, and/or quality or absence of sperm; 
<B) Cervical disease, including immobilization of the 
sperm; 
<C) Endometriosis; 
(D) Other causes including unexplained infertility; 
<E) Or have genetic problems. 
£. We hereby affirm our desire to achieve pregnancy and 
request that artificial insemination procedures be utilized in an 
attempt to achieve pregnancy in the wife with semen obtained from 
an unidentified and undisclosed third party donor(s). 
(A) In order to facilitate the success of this 
procedure? we agree to follow procedures and 
complete documentation as outlined by the 
Department of Obstetrics and/or the Division of 
Urology of the University of Utah School of 
Medicine. 
3. We are aware, on the basis of present information, the 
chances that a pregnancy will be achieved by the artificial 
insemination procedure(s) are 4>0-75/. through six cycles, and 
acknowledge that no representations or guarantees, express or 
implied, have been made to us with respect to whether the 
procedure(s) will be successful. 
A». We have been fully informed of all known significant 
and substantial risks incident to artificial insemination, 
whether fresh or frozen semen is used, which include: 
1 
(A) B 1 eed i i iq and/or i nfec t ion; 
(B) Pain associated with the various procedures; 
(C) Discomfort and complictions connectea with 
pregnancyi childbirth and delivery; 
(D) Birth of an infant or infants suffering from any 
birth defect(s), or of abnormalities of any kind? 
including but not limited to infection(s) or 
disease(s) transmitted through donor semen; 
(E) Uncertainty of genetic. hereditary traits or 
tendencies of such offspring; 
(F) Other adverse consequences of any kind, which are 
unknown but may arise or be connected directly or 
indirectly to the artificial insemination and/or 
procedure(s). 
5. We acknowledge that if pregnancy is achieved there is 
no assurance of a live or healthy birth, or of a normal genetic 
contribution from the donor's sperm* and that in any event, all 
pregnancies face a 3-4*/. risk of some birth defect. 
6. We have been offered the option of carrier testing or 
chromosome testing of the donor if there is a history of 
autosomal recessive trait or a heritable chromosomal 
translocation in the wife. 
7. We have had an unlimited opportunity to ask questions 
about the procedure(s) and the risks involved, ana our questions 
have been fully answered to our satisfaction. 
8. We acknowledge that our participation in the artificial 
insemination procedure(s) is voluntary, 
9. In order to artificially inseminate the wife, the 
doctor hereafter identified shall obtain the necessary semen from 
a third party donor, selected by the doctor. The donor shall not 
at any time be advised of the identity of the wife, nor of the 
success or failure of the insemination. The undersigned, and 
each of them, agree that the identity of the donor shall not be 
divulged to them or any offspring resulting from such 
insemination for any reason by the doctor, except upon the 
issuance of a duly authorized ordei of court of competent 
jurisdiction, the issuance of which shall not be sought by the 
undersigned. The doctor shall require the donor to agree in 
writing not to seek out the identity of the undersigned. 
a 
10. We jointly and severally agree to recognize and accept 
the full legal, moral, parental, financial, sociali emotional ana 
cultural responsibility and care of any offspring that may result 
from any pregnancy achieved through the artificial insemination 
procedure(s). We also mutually and individually agree to accept 
and assume the same duties, obligations and responsibilities 
toward such offspring to the full extent in the same manner as 
owea by the undersigned to naturally occurring offspring, and 
acknowledge and agree that any offspring resulting from the 
artificial insemination procedure(s) shall be their legal heir(s) 
and that the said offspring shall be, for all purposes, the child 
of the husband and wife, and the husband shall for all purposes 
be considered the father of the said offspring. 
11. The doctor in consultation with husband and wife may 
use fresh or frozen semen from one or more unidentified donors, 
to select the donor(s), including the laboratory which has 
collected, processed and stored the semen. It is understood that 
risk factors set forth in paragraph M A ) , (C), t* (D) are greater 
where fresh sperm is used, but we accept those risks. 
IE. We hereby covenant and agree, without reservation of 
rignt, in law or equity, to indemnify, hold harmless and release 
the doctor, the persons who are the donors of the semen, those 
persons who collect, store, and/or preserve and manipulate the 
semen specimens, the University of Utah, the university of Utah 
Hosoitalj the Deoartment of Obstetrics ana Gynecology, the 
Division of Urology, their officers, employees and agents from 
any and all liability or obligation of any kind whatsoever, in 
any manner connected with or related to: 
(A) Complications of pregnancy; 
<B) Complications in any manner connected with child 
birth and/or delivery; 
<C) Birth of any infant or infants suffering from any 
birth defect, or of abnormalities of any kino, 
including but not limited to infections or 
transmitted diseased through donor semen; 
(D) Genetic, hereditary traits or tendencies of such 
offspring; 
(E) Any other adverse consequences of any kind that 
may arise or be connected directly or indirectly 
to or in any manner with offspring resulting from 
the artificial insemination and/or procedure(s) 
herein authorized or contemplated. 
13. We agree, individually and severally, that neither of 
them will at any time, or for any reason assist, aid or abet in 
3 
any way, dr), fDerson, including any child or offspring in 
initiating or pursuing any claim or legal proceeding with respect 
to any matter arising out of, or resulting from the artificial 
insemination proceaure(s) authorized herein. 
!<•. We agree and acknowledge that the procedures<s) 
authorized herein shall be considered for all purposes, medical 
services. 
15. With the above considerations in mind, we, individually 
and as husband and wife? hereby consent toi request and authorize 
Dr, \ N c < ^  , who is herein referred to as "our 
d o c t o r , " a n d s u c h assistants and associates as our doctor may 
designate, tfo undertake one or more artificial insemination 
proceaures in in attempt to achieve pregnancy in the wife, 
understanding and acceptinq all the risks and responsibilities 
attendant thereto. 
16. Confidentiality. We understand that our doctor, the 
Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, the Division of Urology 
and the University of Utah, will consider the information 
developed aoout us during this treatment as confidentiali and 
that neither our identity nor specific medical details will be 
revealed by any of them without our prior consent; however, 
soecific medical details may be revealed in professional 
publications, but our identify is not to be revealed. We 
unaerstana that in tne event an authorized government agency 
reviews this or other documents, they may learr of our identity. 
17. Procedures Authorized to Treat Unforeseen Conditions. 
We recognize that during the course of any of the procedures 
outlined above, unforeseen conditions may necessitate additional 
or different procedures than those set forth above. In the event 
we authorize and request our doctor, his assistants or his 
designees, to perform such procedures as are in the exercise of 
professional judgment necessary and desirable. 
18. We acknowledge that the University of Utah, tne 
University of Utah School of Medicine, the Department of 
Obstetrics and Gynecology, the Division of Urology, and all 
officers and employees, including our doctor, are subject to the 
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Section 63-30-
.li et seq . , U.C.A, 1953 as amended, which Act controls all 
procedures and limitations with respect to claims of liability. 
19. Consent Agreement Binding Upon the Heirs. This Consent 
Agreement shall be binding upon our administrators and heirs. 
h 
SO. Signatures. We acknowledge by our signatures below 
that we have read the foregoing and that all questions pertaining 
thereto have been answered to our satisfaction. 
UNDERSIGNED: 
Wife: T^Y> 
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It couldn't hurt to read this: 
It won't take that long. Don't throw it away. 
And just so you don't get to the end of this and say, "you should have thought 
about that." I know I should have. Believe me. 
What I'd like you to think about is whether over the last year and a half, I've acted 
like someone who wasn't happy with his life, and went out "looking" for someone else? 
This is why I keep reminding you that she called me. (Yes, I know I should have hung 
up.) 
In the last year and a half, we've planned for a new house, vacations, babies, 
furniture, drapes, you name it. We've talked about how to deal with the loss of your job, 
Steph's problems in school, and on and. We've gone out more, camped more, and had 
more fun than we had in five years put together. 
This was not all some elaborate scheme to deceive you, it was how I really felt, 
and howlstill do?7rhe reality of it is that everything really happened. It's all been true. 
And then I screwed up. 
Look at it all together, and put it in perspective. It was a moment of weakness vs 
a year and a half or trying hard at happiness. 
The alternative is ????. There's no way you're going to go to school full time, 
because my income alone won't support two households. We might even be talking stuff 
like whether S£§5$ can go to college or not. And if you get pregnant I've got no idea how 
that's going to work. Think about it. — ' " • ^ 
One of your few faults is that you're too tough. We've talked about it and its 
probably from your childhood, but you feel that if you soften up and compromise a little, 
you're being weak. (You were soft on Thursday night, and I think you had a better 
handle on this whole thing then you've had since) Understanding and sympathy are not 
weak. Don't be too tough for your own good. 
Love, 
Rick 
ROBERT L. NEELEY #2373 
OF CAMPBELL & NEELEY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2485 Grant Ave., Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-3646 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICKY D. KRAMBULE, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE, 
Defendant. 
\ STIPULATION AND PROPERTY 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
) Judge: 
I civil No. W7W7? 
WHEREAS, the plaintiff above named has commenced an 
action for divorce in the above-entitled Court; and 
WHEREAS, the parties are desirous of stipulating and 
agreeing at tnis time with respect to the issues raised by said 
action, NOW THEREFORE, 
IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between the 
parties hereto as follows, to-wit: 
1. That plaintiff may have his hearing to obtain a 
mutual divorce in said action at any time without further notice to 
defendant, subject to the terms and conditions of this Stipulation 
and Agreement. 
2. That defendant is awarded the care, custody and 
control of the parties' minor child, Stephanie Krambule, date of 
birth January 29, 1985. 
STIPULATION 
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3. That plaintiff shall be granetd the standard 
visitation rights as utilized by the Second Judicial District 
Court, Davis County, but in addition, shall be entitled to have the 
minor child each Monday from 5:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. and each 
Wednesday from 5:00 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. provided, however, that 
plaintiff shall pick up the minor child from the day care provider 
and shall return the minor child to the defendant's home at the 
time stated above. 
4. That defendant shall maintain the parties1 minor 
child on her health and accident insurance with Hill Air Force 
Base. Each party shall pay one-half the non-covered medical and 
dental expenses incurred for benefit of the parties' minor child 
and incorporate The Standard Medical Provisions adopted by the 
above-entitled Court herein. The Standard Medical Provisions is 
attached hereto and by reference made a part of this Stipulation. 
In the event defendant does not have available to her at her place 
of employment a medical and health plan, plaintiff shall obtain a 
medical and health plan for benefit of the parties' minor child 
through his employment. 
5. That plaintiff shall pay to defendant the sum of 
$326.00 per month as and for child support based upon his gross 
annual earnings of $39,000.00 per year through Alpine Paving & 
Construction and considering defendant's gross annual earnings of 
(^ 
STIPULATION 
KRAMBULE VS. KRAMBULE 
Civil No. 910750473 
$24,500.00 from Hill Air Force Base. 
6. That plaintiff shall pay to defendant the sum of 
$274.00 per month as and for alimony for a period not to exceed 
four years from June 1, 1991 or until defendant graduates from 
Weber State University whichever event comes first; also, alimony 
shall terminate by operation of law, i.e. cohabitation or 
remarr iage. 
7. That plaintiff shall pay one-half (1/2) of the day 
care expense incurred for benefit of the parties' minor child and 
defendant shall provide written documentation of the monthly child 
care expense. 
8. Plaintiff to pay all reasonable expenses defendant 
may incur for books and tuition at Weber State University as she is 
pursuing a bachelor's degree. Defendant is approximately a 
sophomore in college and plaintiff's obligation to pay for her 
books and tuition shall not extend beyond four years from June 1, 
1991. 
9. That the family home and real property located at 703 
W. 650 N., Clearfield, Utah has been sold and each party has 
received one-half the net sales proceeds, and if there are any 
additional payments received for payment of the reserve account, 
each party shall also divide the same equally. 
10. That defendant shall be awarded the 1987 Jeep 
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Cherokee, her IRA and her retirement at Hill Air Force Base and 
one-half the net sales proceeds from the sale of the home. 
11. That defendant shall be awarded his IRA, his 
retirement, his interest in Alpine Paving, Inc., his camping 
equipment, fishing boat and camping trailer, and one-half the net 
sale proceeds from the sale of the home. 
12. The parties shall divide equally the joint account 
at Shear son Leheman. 
13. That defendant shall be paid $7,825.00 on or before 
January 31, 1993 as reimbursement of one-half the parties prior 
investment in Alpine Paving, Inc. 
14. That the parties have equitably divided the 
household furniture and furnishings and personal effects, and 
neither party makes any claim upon the other for any item of 
personal property. 
15. That plaintiff shall maintain a life insurance 
policy in the sum of $50f000.00 and defendant shall maintain a life 
insurance in the sum of $10,000.00 and each party shall designate 
their minor child, Stephanie Krambule, as beneficiary thereto and 
each shall maintain said child as beneficiary until she reaches at 
least 18 years of age. 
16. That plaintiff may be allowed to claim the parties1 
minor child, Stephanie Krambule, as a dependent for purposes of 
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computation of his Federal and State Income Taxes if he is current 
on his child support and he pays any monetary loss defendant may 
incur by reason of not being allowed to claim said child as a 
dependent for tax purposes. Plaintiff shall pay defendant in cash 
for any loss she may incur prior to defendant signing any forms 
necessary for plaintiff to claim the parties' child as a dependent 
for tax purposes. Defendant to furnish plaintiff all necessary tax 
information no later than February 28 of each year and pla'intiff to 
advise defendant no later than March 30 of each year as to his 
election whether to claim the parties' child as a dependent for tax 
purposes. 
17. That each party shall pay their own attorney fees 
and cost of Court ancurred in these proceedings. 
18. That each party shall pay one-half of any non-
covered medical expense incurred during the course of the marriage 
and each party shall be responsible to pay any debts and 
obligations they may have incurred since their date of separation 
on or about May 3, 1991. 
19. That plaintiff shall be solely responsible for all 
business debts incurred in connection with Alpine Paving, Inc. and 
shall hold defendant harmless thereon. 
20. In the event defendant decides to move from the 
immediate area, she shall notify plaintiff of her intent to 
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relocate, and in any event, plaintiff shall receive a minimum of 
forty-five (45) days actual notification prior to leaving, 
DATED this /£ day of Q ^ * ^ , v , 1992.. 
CKY D. WRAMBULE RI 
Plaintiff 
fOBERT L. NZ^LEY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
BARBARA R. KRAWBULE 
Defendant 
^ 
Attorney for Defendant 
u UJ~ K(i 
Vlahos, Sharp & Wight 
i N VLAHOS A T T O R N E Y S AT L A W PHONE (son 621 2464 
ONSHARP FAX (801) 621 6218 
ALD S WIGHT LEGAL FORUM BUILDING 2447 KIESEL AVENUE 
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December 3, 1991 
Attorney Robert L. Neeley 
2485 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
RE; Krambule vs. Krambule 
My File No. 400-11909-V 
Dear Robert: 
In connection with the above matter, my client has 
recently brought to my attention an item that she debated 
at great lengths whether she should or should not pursue 
and has finally decided she's going to pursue it. 
Your client and my client agreed to artificial insem-
ination so that the parties could have another child. 
This artificial insemination was in fact conducted 
and as a result my client is pregnant and expecting a 
child. 
She is somewhere between 4 and 6 months pregnant 
and since he agreed to the artificial insemination and 
she's going to obtain for me his written consent, the 
child is his and I've tried this before where the Court 
has acknowledged these types of agreements. 
My client has indicated that if he will not put up 
a fuss over this child, pay the child support in accordance 
with the schedule for the children, then she would give up 
any claim she has to alimony. 
In addition, she indicated that she would allow 
overnight visits on Mondays and Wednesdays and when school 
is not in session, which would include holidays and summer 
vacation. 
Please review this with your client, get back with me 
Re: Krambule \ . Krambule 
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and if we can work out a Stipulation along those lines, let 
me know. 
The Stipulation you sent me does not provide for that 
and my client is not willing to sign it. 
I did forward to her a copy, she has it, and that's 
what brought this to mind because she does not feel that 
this child should be left out and the parties would then 
have two children, Stephanie and whatever this child turns 
out to be, whether it's a boy or a girl. 
Please review this with your client and get back with 
me and if we can resolve it great and if not, then let's 
get it tried. I don't believe we've had a Pre-trial yet and 
if your client is not willing to negotiate this item then 
one or both of us should file a request for Pre-trial. 
I will await your response. I remain, 
PNV:kh 
cc: Barbara Krambule 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I placed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari in the United States mail, postage prepaid, on this 14th day of February, 
2000 to: 
ROBERT L. NEELEY 
Attorney for Respondent 
2485 Grant Avenue, #200 
Ogden, UT 84401 
